Title:
PP/GC/PO/257 Letter from Lord Ponsonby to Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, enclosing letters from General Chrzanowski about the Turkish army, 15 September 1836
Date:
15/09/1836
Content:
Letter from John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby, [ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Constantinople], to Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston: he is making use of a French messenger to send Palmerston a letter received from General [Chrzanowski] and his plan for organising the army. The letter is not recent, and Ponsonby is sorry that nothing has yet been done by the Seraskier. The General is very impatient, though, like Ponsonby, he believes that the old minister will not move before he sees, in the acts of the British government, reason to believe that he may find support from them, if, in conformity with their suggestions, he does anything that may be unpalatable to the Russians. Everyone thinks this time will never come. Colonel Considine has not heard from the Seraskier, except the complimentary speeches made at the review, which were represented to Palmerston. Ponsonby does not expect Colonel Considine will ever obtain a command in Turkey, and he has told Ponsonby that he will not consent to be employed as a mere instructor. Ponsonby thinks he is quite right on this point. "As I can say nothing to you but things that must be extremely disagreeable to you, I will hold my peace." 15 Sep 1836 Enclosed are: (i) Letter, in French, from General Adalbert Chrzanowski, Rami Criflit, to John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby: at Chrzanowski's first interview with the Seraskier, the Seraskier proposed a visit to Rami Criflit to see the Twentieth Regiment, and suggested that Chrzanowski should tell him his ideas and improvements for the regiment and at the same time, to write down ideas for innovation or change in the Turkish army. Chrzanowski agreed to the proposal and inspected the regiment and found that it was well trained. It could execute the most difficult manoeuvres very well, but these manoeuvres, precisely because they are difficult, would be worthless in war, and no-one had taught the men simple manoeuvres, which are the only ones to use against an enemy. However, this regiment would learn these very quickly, once given the order. The shortcomings in dress and equipment, together with old ordnance, would be easily changed if one so wished. During the Seraskier's visit to Rami Criflit, Chrzanowski presented several elementary ideas about the troops to him. The Seraskier had also invited Chrzanowski to visit him at the Eski Seray [Old Palace] and had asked him about the manner of giving battle. He was pleased with what Chrzanowski told him, and asked Chrzanowski to stay with him to write it down and to be present at the translation [into Turkish], which Chrzanowski did. The Seraskier was very happy with what Chrzanowski wrote and said that he would not send Chrzanowski to Asia, but keep him at hand. Chrzanowski reminded the Seraskier of his two officers at Broussa, and put it to him that they could be employed at Rami Criflit. The Seraskier consented, Chrzanowski wrote a letter and the ?'Tartar' was sent to fetch them. Chrzanowski returned to Rami Criflit, having promised the Seraskier he would write further on other topics. The Turks are very eager for Chrzanowski's ideas and proposals, and this can be explained by the fact that they want to exploit Chrzanowski before the situation with the Russians is clarified. Chrzanowski, for his part, falls in with their wishes, but hopes that, after a fortnight, he can make them realise that they have much to learn and that this will enable them to hold firm when clarifications are made. The Prussian dragoman asked the Seraskier whether he wanted to publicise the arrival of English and Polish officers at Constantinople; the Seraskier replied that perhaps they were at Pera, but that he knew nothing. Knowing this, Chrzanowski has complied with the Seraskier's wishes and remains at Criflit, although the stay is particularly irksome because, although the Seraskier may say that he knows nothing about whether Chrzanowski is at Pera or not, he would not be able to give the same reply if asked what Chrzanowski was doing at his [the Seraskier's] country house. The Seraskier proposed the previous day that Chrzanowski should wear Turkish clothes. Chrzanowski replied vaguely, not saying yes or no, because he first wants to know Ponsonby's opinion on this subject, and in general on the conduct of the whole affair. He asks Ponsonby to send him instructions, which he will follow. 24 Jun 1836 Attached is a memorandum in the hand of Lord Ponsonby: "June 25th ?1836. I open my letter to send the enclosed letter from General Chrzanowsky." (ii) Letter, in French, from General Adalbert Chrzanowski, Rami Criflit, to John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby: he has received Ponsonby's letter of 25 [June] with the permission to write more often. The Seraskier has had the idea of carrying out battle manoeuvres on the field, as Chrzanowski proposed, but as Chrzanowski had planned them for an army of forty thousand, the Seraskier asked him to arrange the same manoeuvres for eighteen battalions, stationed in and around Constantinople, and to work out the number of cavalry and artillery. Chrzanowski sent him the scheme for organising this small part of the army and some of the details of the manoeuvre, but at the same time he observed to the Seraskier that before undertaking large scale manoeuvres on the field, the generals should know what they would have to do, and that the divisions should each attempt the manoeuvres separately, because Turkish troops are not used to joint manoeuvres with artillery or in groups greater than one battalion. Chrzanowski demonstrated the manoeuvre, with pawns, to a couple of generals and several officers. During his talk with the Seraskier, as well as details of a platoon of skirmishers and the operations of a large army, they also discussed political matters. Ponsonby has alarmed the Turks. They await with anxiety the reply from London about the English merchant [?Churchill]. They fear that England will desert them and that this affair will serve as the pretext. Chrzanowski said that he knew very little about this affair of the English merchant and even less about the decision the British cabinet would come to, but that he knew that England wished to see Turkey strong, and she wished to help Turkey become strong. He thought he should tell them, at the first opportunity and without going into details, his reasons why, in the improbable situation of relations between England and Turkey being broken off, he would not stay with them, not only because he felt his position would be too risky, but above all because the object of his going to Rami Criflit would be entirely lost. If the Seraskier is not completely false, he will be well disposed in Chrzanowski's favour in evaluating his protests. Amongst other things, the Seraskier said the previous day that he was ashamed that he had done nothing more for Chrzanowski. Starting from the end succeeded better with the Seraskier than starting from the beginning. Once the order of battle had pleased him, it was easier to convince him of the necessity of introducing changes in the organisation of the divisions, to enable them to adapt to this manner of engaging battle. The Seraskier would quickly consent to changes in small details. It was also decided that a battalion of sappers should be formed. Nevertheless, so far, nothing has really been done, with the exception that the regiments have been ordered to change the marching order, since Chrzanowski persuaded the Seraskier that, marching as they do, the divisions would not be able to deploy themselves quickly enough.p> The Turkish military force comprises twenty five regiments of infantry, of which four are guards, each regiment having four battalions, and twenty two regiments of cavalry, of four squadrons, and forty two batallions of militia besides. The battalions of troops of the line are between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred men; those of the militia between one thousand and one thousand three hundred. The squadrons have one hundred and fifty men. If they worked hard at it, Chrzanowski believes that the following spring, besides the fortress garrisons, sixty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horses will be ready to go to war. These troops will not look quite like European troops, but the ill-fitting and badly made uniforms, bare ankles and other such things which offend the European eye do not prevent them being good troops. What is a necessity elsewhere is not necessary with the Turks. Only the artillery is a little too Turkish, but after a few months it will be possible to remedy this and make it capable of keeping the field. Even if the Seraskier's response is still evasive, publicity will not spoil Chrzanowski's mission: although the Seraskier had been disposed to keep the thing secret, he had allowed himself to make it known to the Turks by himself putting Chrzanowski into contact with many of them. Besides, during Chrzanowski's visits to the Eski Seray [Old Palace], the courtesy shown to him by the Pasha roused the interest of the crowd of Greeks he met there. It is therefore impossible that the Russians have not been informed of the mission and the Seraskier is already guilty in their eyes. 29 Jun 1836 (iii) Letter, in French, from General Chrzanowski, Rami Criflit, to John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby: he is grateful for Ponsonby's permission to use the courier, and encloses a letter for London. He believes he is close to being able to present his work to Ponsonby personally, together with his thanks. Several days previously, Chrzanowski had an interview with the Seraskier and explained to him that he was beginning to tire of his role. In order to satisfy Chrzanowski, the Seraskier proposed to make him, and his two accompanying officers, an appointment. Chrzanowski accepted on his men's behalf. He told the Seraskier that as far as he was concerned, he was in no hurry to be paid, whether within two months or ten, but that he only wished to know what he was to do, and that the so-called secret should come to an end. The Seraskier said that he would keep Chrzanowski near him and that the secrecy would come to an end. He has assigned Chrzanowski lodgings in his palace on the Bosporus, described as a little paradise, but has asked Chrzanowski to remain patiently for several more days at Rami Criflit and to begin preparations for an inspection near ?Aistophanie. The greater the Seraskier's wish for this inspection, the better it will be for Chrzanowski. Ponsonby is perfectly right to say that the Turks are a little childish. They already know enough to see that they are doing things badly and not sufficiently well to do without Chrzanowski. As a result, Chrzanowski is indispensable. It is true that this makes for amusement, but it would be more useful if things were taken seriously. If the Seraskier forgets his promises, Chrzanowski will have occasion to remind him of them. He asks Ponsonby to send him one hundred and fifty pounds or the authority to use some part of this sum. 15 Jul 1836 (iv) Copy, in the hand of a secretary, of enclosure (iii) 15 Jul 1836: contemporary copy (v) Letter from General Adalbert Chrzanowski, Rami ?Criflit, to John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby: on Monday [25 July] he told the Seraskier that he did not want to remain as he was any longer, but the Seraskier could not give an answer whether Chrzanowski should stay on in Pera as a private individual simply to maintain his relations with the Seraskier, or should enter active service. In the one case, the Seraskier would have to await information through Chrzanowski's connection with the Russians; in the other, by entering active service Chrzanowski would be more useful position to him. The Seraskier again promised convincingly to arrange this affair but all that has happened is that he writes letters to Chrzanowski using Chrzanowski's real name. Chrzanowski will return to the task the following week. One of his officers is going to Angora on Saturday [30 July]: he is in the governor's circle, and the governor has orders to form a new regiment. Chrzanowski has sent back to the Seraskier the note of which he encloses a copy [not present] which has bearing on his and Ponsonby's conversation the previous Monday [25 July]. Chrzanowski noted that the Turks have grievances against England for her behaviour in 1833, and that they looked favourably on Russian conduct at that time. At the same time, they are a little distrustful of England: even the Seraskier is, despite his being a declared enemy of the Russians. If the Seraskier follows up Chrzanowski's note, he will ask Ponsonby for further instructions. He is ashamed to admit that he is not Englishman enough to understand Ponsonby writing in English, but he is ready to try. 28 Jul 1836 (vi) Letter, in French, from General Adalbert Chrzanowski, Rami Tchiflit, to John Ponsonby, second Baron Ponsonby, later first Viscount Ponsonby: in one of his first interviews with the Seraskier, Chrzanowski presented to him the necessity of introducing reform into the organization of the pashaliks. He did not make any reply, and it was not until the previous Monday that he returned to this subject and asked Chrzanowski for a plan, giving him forty eight hours to complete it; but, impatient as he is, he came on the Tuesday to fetch it. Chrzanowski was obliged to finish it in a hurry and he made sure to send a copy to Ponsonby. He believes that too great authority will be given to the Seraskier if the proposal is accepted, but this seemed necessary to Chrzanowski, given the current state of Turkish affairs. Besides, when it is no longer necessary, the authority, concentrated in the hands of a single person, would only have to be shared out between a minister of war and a Seraskier. Since Monday [15 August], the Seraskier has been extremely happy and free from the cares which he and his fat courtiers have calmed. The Seraskier is believed to be on good terms now with the Sultan, because the Sultan is said to have promised the Seraskier to be at his kiosk in order to watch the manoeuvre during which the troops, composed of seven battalions, four squadrons and eight cannon, carried out a firing exercise. Chrzanowski does not know whether the Sultan was there, but the Seraskier out of courtesy drew up the troops in line facing the kiosk and fired a salute in honour of the Sultan. The Seraskier has already confirmed the organization of the troops and the general staff and this will soon be under way. Chrzanowski is going to try to make the Seraskier see the faults in the disposition of the troops in Asia. These troops are deployed in such a way that, if hostilities were to break out again with Mehemet Ali, if Ibrahim knows his business he will be able to destroy Reschid's army without needing to win a major battle and almost without serious combat. Chrzanowski has broached this subject, but he has not got any further with it. The troops around Baghdad are so well entrenched that they would need over a month to take up positions from which they could put up a resistance to Ibrahim and at the same time cover Baghdad much more effectively. The Seraskier should then form an army in Rumelia, so that that frontier is not completely defenceless as it is at present. As the army in Asia will have to be depleted for this, Chrzanowski cannot propose it before the Turks are certain that Ibrahim is not going to recommence hostilities. This assurance can only come to them from England, is she so wish, as she presently has in the Mediterranean a fleet more than sufficient to overwhelm Mehemet Ali. Chrzanowski awaits Ponsonby's orders on this subject. [Ponsonby has written in the margin, in pencil, "I am not authorized to give the assurance required, was my reply. Ponsonby."] Nearly six months is required to distribute the Turkish forces in a suitable manner. There would be an army in Asia, located so that it may, according to circumstances, proceed towards Aleppo or Erzurum; another army in Rumelia to cover this province and to make its presence felt in Albania; and a third, not an army as such, which could be split between the two banks of the Bosporus and on which the strongholds of the Dardanelles would also depend. This part of the Turkish forces would safeguard the heart of the empire against unexpected attack, and could also serve to reinforce the army in Rumelia, if necessary. The Seraskier seems happy with all of this and assures Chrzanowski that he can consider his personal standing as a fact, although it is still without an official character. Chrzanowski admits he has not pressed the Seraskier about this during the previous twenty days. 19 Aug 1836 (vii) Copy, in the hand of a secretary, of enclosure (vi) 19 Aug 1836: contemporary copy (viii) Copy, in his own hand, of a memorandum written by General Adalbert Chrzanowski on the establishment of territorial military divisions in Turkey: after the fall of the Roman empire in Europe, the commanders of the armed force were at the same time civil administrators of the countries occupied by the army under their command. In time, the sovereigns generally felt the disadvantages of this system of concentrating both civil and military power in one person, and were convinced that inevitably one of the two branches would suffer from neglect, and that quite soon both would pass away. Reform was therefore carried out everywhere at different times, and nowadays the command of troops and the civil administration are two separate branches. Sovereigns gain in strength and their subjects in well-being by these changes. Turkey is the only country where this ancient system has remained until the present day. As this system here is as detrimental to the power of the government and to the prosperity of the nation as it was elsewhere, reform, which has proved so advantageous elsewhere, is urgently required. The division of a country, as regards civil administration, cannot be the same as its division for military purposes. One essential condition for administrative districts is that they should enable the inhabitants to arrange their affairs conveniently, so districts should not be too large. Military divisions, however, can be larger, for greater uniformity and unity in action.p> The manner in which France is divided can serve as a model. Turkey could be divided, for administrative purposes, into parts corresponding to the French departements, but with a Turkish name, and two, three or four of these parts would make up a territorial military division, where the Pasha would perform the same functions as the commander of a territorial military division performs in France. He will have command of the redifs as well as the regular troops and all individual soldiers, currently in garrisons or temporarily in his pashalik. He will oversee the instruction, appearance and discipline of his troops so that everything accords with the Seraskier's orders on the subject. He will not, however, involve himself in the details of the service and the internal administration of the corps without having received the order from the Seraskier or, in extraordinary circumstances, where his authority is necessary to re-establish order. For example, if dissension breaks out amongst the officers, or if suspicions of embezzlement or disloyalty fall upon a soldier, he will decree proper measures and immediately notify the Seraskier of his intervention. He will oversee order and service in all war zones and forts within his pashalik. He will also be responsible for the upkeep of military buildings and fortifications, as well as all the military establishments, but will not be able to undertake new building work without the authorisation of the Seraskier. He will oversee recruitment according to orders received from the Seraskier. Lastly, the military police throughout his pashalik will be under his orders. The police must maintain public order, deliver justice and oversee the conduct of all soldiers, and of sailors and marines when they are on land. In time of war, the government will detail those pashas near the centre of action to obey the orders of the commander in chief of the army active in the region. During this time the pashaliks' civil authority will be subordinate to the military authority. According to the needs of the service, one or two brigadier generals could be attached to the Pasha to help him carry out his functions, and he will have close to him a general staff, the number being dependent on the extent and importance of the territorial military division. The chief of the general staff, a colonel or lieutenant colonel will have central oversight of all the office work which will be shared between sections. The first section, under the direction of the chief of the general staff himself, will be responsible for the detailed administration of the general staff, the organisation of the redifs, troop movements in the pashalik, military justice and recruitment. The second section, under the direction of a major, will be responsible for the detailed administration of the military stations in the pashalik, for determining the day-to-day service, and for overseeing barracks, hospitals and prisons. The third section, under the direction of a major of the artillery, will be responsible for the artillery service in the military stations, gunpowder shops, arsenals, foundries, manufacturers of arms, gunpowder factories and forges. The fourth section, under the direction of a major of the engineers, will be responsible for the construction and maintenance of military buildings. The fifth section, under the direction of an employee of the military administration, will be responsible for the payroll, supplies, hospitals, transports, and the accounts of the war service. n.d. c.Aug 1836 (ix) Copy, in the hand of a secretary, of enclosure (viii) n.d. c.Aug 1836: contemporary copy (x) Copy, in his own hand, of a memorandum written by General Adalbert Chrzanowski on the political position in Turkey: when the conflict which has been brewing between England and Russia breaks out, Turkey cannot remain a passive spectator. She is not strong enough for this. Situated on the line of fire between the powers, she will be equally maltreated by the two parties, and will run the risk that if the conflict long remains indecisive, the two exhausted rival powers will make a temporary truce at her expense. Turkey must take sides before conflict breaks out, because if she does not, it is possible that England and Russia, recoiling from the dangers of war and the sacrifices it necessitates, will hit upon the idea of postponing the moment of conflict by sacrificing Turkey. Setting this aside, Turkey will only have the choice to ally herself with England or with Russia. This, however, is not feasible in practice. England has never coveted Turkish possessions: they would not give her an advantage at present. They are not and were not in her interests. Her demands, if she made them, would bring her, at most, some commercial advantages. As for Russia, mistress of several Turkish provinces for over half a century already, she openly acknowledges her claims on Constantinople. Once the time comes to possess Constantinople, Russia will not be able to restrain herself. To enjoy the advantages of possessing Constantinople, Russia would want gain mastery of the Asiatic side of the coast. Then, to secure her acquisitions in Asia Minor, she would have to push her conquests as far as the Taurus, the shortest, and at the same time the strongest, line. Briefly, the complete destruction of the Ottoman empire is in Russia's interests. She would easily be able to call halts at intervals, to feign moderation and conceal her ambitious projects, but that would only be to take a rest or to achieve her goal with less risk. Having made some conquests outside her natural frontiers, Russia is compelled to make others, and these will force her to push on even further. Russian expansion has such great momentum that it can no longer stop. These considerations make alliance between Turkey and Russia seem monstrous, and the Turkish nation instinctively feels the truth of this very strongly. The support which Russia recently gave to the Sultan cannot be cited to contradict it. On that occasion, whatever it seemed, England, in refusing, and Russia in granting support were only remaining loyal to their own interests. England wished, as always, for Turkey to be a strong power, and, as happens in politics, she put the question to second rate individuals. Russia, disturbed by the support shown by the Muslim populations in favour of Ibrahim, and fearing that these people would form an alliance against her, preferred to keep the empire divided in two, to weaken it. Since then, in demanding a firman against Mehemet Ali, England has proved that she now wants to maintain the unity of Turkey in the person of the Sultan. Her material interests are such a mere trifle in this affair that it is impossible to suppose that they are the incentive for this demand. Alliance with Russia is impossible, but so that Turkey is not reduced to begging for protection from England, and can present an offer of alliance to England, she must quickly put her armed force onto a respectable footing and arrange them in such a manner that England can see that Turkey is in a state to put some weight in the balance. Given these attitudes of the two powers towards Turkey, it naturally follows that every measure taken by Turkey to return to her former state of splendour and power will be viewed with pleasure by England, and completely the opposite by Russia. It has come to the point where, in taking these measures, Turkey will be have to keep one part secret and to conceal under plausible pretexts those which cannot remain unknown. Chrzanowski cannot enter into details on this subject since he is not sufficiently aware of the true strength of the existing army and how it is deployed, and the resources of the country. n.d. c.Aug 1836 (xi) Copy, in the hand of a secretary, of enclosure (x) n.d. c.Aug 1836: contemporary copy (xii) Copy, in his own hand, of a memorandum written by General Adalbert Chrzanowski on the defence of Constantinople: in the current situation, Constantinople must be defended at the Bosporus. It will thus be necessary to place sufficient garrisons in the castles on the Bosporus without, however, crowding them with too many men. The cannons at these castles must be supplied with shells adapted to their calibre. Such shells are better than cannon balls, because a cannon ball only makes a hole in a ship, which the enemy can plug with a ready-made bung, whereas a shell, although it does not come with such force, instead of a single hole makes multiple fractures which become even bigger upon explosion, and the enemy cannot repair them there and then. Thus a single salvo, if it hits the ship near the water line, can be enough to sink her. The gunners will have to be taught this more effective method of firing. Behind each pair of castles, a ship will have to be brought broadside on, to take on the Russian ships coming to attack the castle batteries. Such salvoes are very dangerous to spar and sail. A couple more ships should be brought broadside on, protected by the land batteries set up along the approach the Russians will take. This precaution is necessary so that the castle defenders do not get demoralised when a Russian ship, under a favourable current and wind, successfully passes the castles without notable losses. Once prepared for such an event, instead of fearing it, one would wish for it, because the Russian ships would become victim to this audacious strike, and being unable to return, they would be obliged to surrender. It is almost certain that the Russians, on discovering these preparations, will not risk forcing the passage, an operation which can only turn to their disadvantage, and that if they not do retreat, they will be obliged to attack by land. They could do this by landing with all their forces on the European side, or by landing part of the troops in Europe and the other part in Asia, or by landing all their forces on the Asiatic side. The Turkish troops assembled to resist the Russian attacks must all be stationed close to Constantinople. They cannot muster enough troops to be superior in Europe and in Asia, so the least important place will have to be sacrificed in order to gain the upper hand at the most important point. The troops assembled at Daud Pacha along the Russian line of approach must be pushed forward into a position a little behind the castles of the Bosporus, and reconnoitre up to the Black Sea. If the Russians disembark with all their forces on the European coast, which will bring them directly to their goal, the Turkish troops will be in a position to attack them within twenty four hours of receiving that information unless the Russians disembark far along the coast of the Black Sea, but then the danger will be less pressing. The details of this attack cannot be given out now, because they inevitably depend on the Russians' landing point and the way they set about it. All that can be said is that the attack must take place with the greatest possible force, and that the Turks have luck on their side, since to fight at sea, as the Russians will be obliged to do here, has always been dangerous. Besides, they will have very few cavalry, and indeed, twenty four hours after landing men begin to feel the fatigue of the crossing, and do not have the same energy that they might otherwise have. It will be a mistake for the Russians to divide themselves and raid the European and Asiatic sides at the same time. It would only be necessary, at first, to concentrate on holding out in the castles in Asia, and then to fall upon the troops disembarked in Europe, where the Turks would have a much better hand than in the situation detailed above. The destruction of this part of the Russian troops would probably result in the troops landed in Asia hurrying to return to their ships. If they do not do that, however, Turkish troops must be crossed into Asia to coerce them. Lastly, if the Russians land all their troops on the Asiatic coast, the war can and must be dragged out, to give time for the English fleet to arrive. The progress of the Russians from this side is not conclusive and their arrival even at Skutari does not advance them very much. If they do not embark quickly on the approach of the English fleet, the troops can easily be forced to lay down their arms once the Russian fleet has been beaten. n.d. c.Aug 1836 (xiii) Copy, in the hand of a secretary, of enclosure (xii), marked "Readable copy, probably 1836 or 1837".
Extent:
Twenty one papers, some punched for disinfection, some tied with blue ribbon
License:
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Subject:
General Adalbert Chrzanowski, alias Skranowsky, Polish officer in English employ in Turkey
Husrev Mehmed Pasha, alias Chossrew Muhammad Pasha, Seraskier, or Turkish Minister of War
Lieutenant Colonel James Considine of the Fifty Third Regiment of Foot
Rami Criflit; Rami Tehiflit, ?Constantinople, later Istanbul, Turkey
Broussa, or Bursa, or Brusa, or Brussa, Turkey
Pera, suburb of Constantinople, later Istanbul, Turkey
Stiepovich, Prussian drogoman at Constantinople
?Aistophanie, Turkey
Angora, or Ankara, Turkey
Mahmud II, Ottoman Sultan
Muhammad Ali Pasha, alias Mehemet Ali Pasha, Viceroy or ruler of Egypt
Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali Pasha alias Mehemet Ali Pasha, Viceroy or ruler of Egypt
Reschid Mustapha Pasha, alias Reshid Mustafa Pasha, Turkish envoy extraordinary at Paris
Baghdad, or Bagdad, Ottoman Empire, later Iraq
Rumelia, or Roumelia, Ottoman territory in the Balkans
Aleppo, Syria
Erzurum, or Erzerum, Turkey
Redif: Ottoman army reserve
Pashalik: Ottoman province, also known as a eyalet or vilayet
Daud Pasha, or Davut Pasha, or Davutpasa, district outside Istanbul, Turkey
Skutari, or Scutari, or Uskudar, Turkey
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